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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-1806 
___________ 
 
ISAN CONTANT, 
Appellant 
v. 
 
MARY SABOL; JENNIFER ROGERS, Counselor; 
VALERIE KREPPS, Counselor; LOIS, Counselor; RICHARD J. HODOROVIC; 
OFFICER JOHN DOE (“#800”); DEPUTY WARDEN DOLL; 
DEPUTY WARDEN JOHN DOE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-00075) 
District Judge:  Honorable William W. Caldwell 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 3, 2011 
 
Before:  BARRY, FISHER and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 16, 2011) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Isan Contant, an immigration detainee, appeals pro se from the District Court’s 
order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss his civil rights complaint.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 In January 2010, while confined in the York County Prison, Contant filed a 
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He alleged that prison officials improperly 
placed him in the Behavioral Adjustment Unit (“BAU”) rather than the Intensive Care 
Unit (“ICU”) after he was charged with assaulting another inmate, violated his due 
process rights at a disciplinary hearing by relying on a report that incorrectly listed the 
time of the alleged assault, and refused to issue a check from his prison account to pay a 
“business entity.”1
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The Court 
exercises plenary review over the District Court’s grant of the defendants’ motion to 
  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The District Court granted the motion, concluding that 
Contant’s placement in the BAU was not punishment, that there was sufficient evidence 
to support the disciplinary finding, and that “[w]hatever limits the due process clause may 
put on a prison’s control of inmate or detainee accounts, it was not breached here by” the 
refusal to issue a check to pay a business entity.  Contant appealed. 
                                                 
1 Contant also complained that officials improperly confiscated photographs which 
had been mailed to him.  After Contant filed his complaint, officials at the York County 
Prison determined that the photographs did not violate prison policy and released them to 
Contant.  Contant agreed that his claim related to the photographs had been rendered 
moot. 
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dismiss.  See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).  We 
accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint and draw reasonable 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007) 
(per curiam).  To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)). 
 Because Contant was an immigration detainee at the time of the alleged 
constitutional violations, he is entitled to the same protections as a pretrial detainee.  See 
Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000).  “[W]hen pretrial detainees 
challenge their conditions of confinement, we must consider whether there has been a 
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Hubbard v. Taylor, 
538 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).  The Supreme Court has instructed that “the proper 
inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.”  Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).  To determine whether challenged conditions of 
confinement amount to punishment, the “Bell Court mandated a pragmatic approach . . . 
and formulated the ‘reasonable relationship’ test . . . .”  Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 
62, 67 (3d Cir. 2007).  Under that test, “if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial 
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, 
without more, amount to ‘punishment.’”  Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.  Of course, “[e]nsuring 
security and order at the institution is a permissible nonpunitive objective, whether the 
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facility houses pretrial detainees, convicted inmates, or both.”  Id. at 561.  In this case, 
Contant was placed in the BAU on December 25, 2009, immediately after being charged 
with assaulting an inmate.  Contant complained that his placement in the BAU, as 
opposed to the ICU, was an excessive response to his disciplinary infraction.  Notably, 
however, Contant fails to allege that the defendants had an express intent to punish him, 
that placement in the RHU was excessive under the circumstances, or that the defendants 
were not acting to ensure institutional security.  See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (“Absent a 
showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that 
determination generally will turn on ‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the 
restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears 
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].’” (quoting Kennedy v. 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963))). 
 Contant further alleged that his due process rights were violated at the disciplinary 
hearing.  A pretrial detainee who is transferred to more restrictive housing for 
disciplinary infractions is entitled to the due process protections applicable to sentenced 
inmates.  Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70-71 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 
(1974)).  Those protections include written notice, adequate time to prepare a defense, a 
written statement of the reasons for action taken, and a limited ability to present 
witnesses and evidence.  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561-70.  Contant did not allege that he was 
denied these protections.  Instead, he claimed that the Disciplinary Board members 
improperly relied on an incident report which contained inaccurate information.  
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According to Contant’s complaint, the incident report was prepared by “Officer 790,” 
who claimed that he witnessed Contant assault an inmate at 9:40 a.m. on December 25, 
2009.  Contant testified at the hearing, however, that he was not awake at that time and 
that “Officer 790” was not on duty during the assault.  The Disciplinary Board concluded 
that the report was more credible than Contant’s testimony, reasoning that “Officer 790” 
mistakenly provided the wrong time on the incident report.  Because the record contained 
evidence to support the conclusion that Contant had assaulted an inmate, we conclude 
that Contant’s due process rights were not violated.  See Superintendent, Mass. 
Correctional Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985) (holding that Fourteenth 
Amendment due process requires that a disciplinary finding be supported by “some 
evidence” in the record). 
 Finally, Contant complained that the defendants refused to issue a check or money 
order from his prison account to a “business entity.”  We have recognized that inmates 
have a property interest in funds held in their prison accounts.  Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 
F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 1997).  Therefore, “inmates are entitled to due process with 
respect to any deprivation of [] money” from their accounts.  Id.  Here, however, Contant 
did not allege that any money was seized or assessed from his account, and he failed to 
identify how the refusal to issue a check deprived him of a protected property interest for 
due process purposes.  Burns v. PA Dept. of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 286 (3d Cir. 2008); see 
also Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (“[C]ertain privileges and rights 
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must necessarily be limited in the prison context.”).  Therefore, we will affirm the 
District Court’s dismissal of this claim. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that no substantial question is presented by 
this appeal.  See I.O.P. 10.6.  Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
